Making A Market? Contestation And Climate Change by Pearse, B
MAKING A MARKET?  
CONTESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Rebecca Pearse 
In the last two decades political contestation over climate change 
generally, and climate policy specifically, has been waged over the 
merits, design and implementation of market-based regulatory 
mechanisms. This includes emissions trading, carbon taxation and 
various voluntary measures. Emissions trading has been at the centre of 
national and international debates with the provision for emissions 
trading and other supporting ‘Flexible Mechanisms’ in the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. In turn, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) was installed in 2005 alongside a range of smaller schemes by state 
and corporate enterprises mostly in OECD nations.1 Multi-lateral and bi-
lateral agreements between states and public-private partnerships are also 
a distinct feature of the push toward carbon markets.2 Thus, in no small 
                                                          
1  In 2008, the global carbon market was estimated to be worth $US126 billion more 
than double the total market value in 2007, with a much smaller rise to $US143 
billion in 2009 (Capoor & Ambrosi 2009; Kossoy & Ambrosi 2010). Various 
compliance and voluntary emissions trading schemes have been developed by 
state, corporate actors and with the input or support of civil society organisations. 
They vary in size, design characteristics, sectoral and geographic scope (Ellis & 
Tirpak 2006). There are nine emissions trading schemes hosted in OECD nations: 
North America (the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Chicago CCX, Alberta 
Offset scheme), Europe (the EU ETS, the linked Norway ETS and Switzerland 
ETS) and the Asia-Pacific (the Japanese Voluntary ETS, NSW Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement Scheme and the recently installed New Zealand ETS). The Kyoto 
Protocol is a framework for inter-state emissions trading. ‘Flexible Mechanisms’ 
in the Protocol include emissions trading for Annex I nations with emissions 
reduction requirements, alongside two baseline-and-credit schemes that produce 
carbon offsets in non-Annex I countries: the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).  
2  For example, the Indonesia-Australia and Papua New Guinea-Australia Forest 
Carbon Partnerships agreed to in 2008 are explicitly intended to anticipate the 
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way does climate governance constitute the process of installing new 
markets for capital accumulation. In fact, amidst the fragmenting nature 
of the governance processes, it seems only one common thread remains: 
the commitment to market-based initiatives.  
However, the market-oriented machinations of climate governance are 
not a uniform phenomenon spreading in a linear fashion from global to 
local contexts. The waxing and waning potential for a global integrated 
market in tradeable greenhouse gas emission rights is a case in point. 
Major compliance schemes in the United States, Canada, Japan and 
Australia are on the back-burner. Carbon markets are being established in 
a haphazard fashion, dampening the hopes for globally integrated market. 
At best the future of the market will entail cooperative fragmentation and 
at worst, markets will be siloed in disjointed schemes (Flaschland et al. 
2010). There are a number of factors hindering the pace and reach of 
carbon markets across most regions. Focusing on contestation, this paper 
draws out the interplay between three collective social formations 
seeking sway over climate governance.  
I make the case that there is permeability and variability in the neoliberal 
climate project that brings both hope and a distinct analytic challenge to 
political scientists and movement actors alike. Given that debate, 
negotiation and outcomes in regard to market-based policy are 
fragmented, at times contradictory, and highly contested, how do we 
explain the sustained but duplicitous faith in the market to deliver 
ecological outcomes? Where is there space in the political fields of 
climate governance to realise non-market alternatives? This paper’s 
analytic focus straddles political economic questions concerning new 
market creation and sociological interpretations of political contestation. 
Neo-Gramscian insights (Carroll 2007, 2009; Gill 1995a, 2008) into the 
nature of politics and hegemony are enlisted. I outline three political 
orientations taken to be in a war of position over climate governance: 
climate markets, climate action and climate justice. After outlining an 
                                                                                                                      
marketisation of the pending United Nations framework on forest conservation and 
land-use change. The PNG and Australian governments have pledged to 'exchange 
experience and expertise that will support Papua New Guinea's and Australia's 
participation in international carbon markets' (DCCEE 2008: 2). Partnerships 
building the forest carbon market agenda such as this have fuelled a spate of 
carbon trading entrepreneurs developing forest offset projects for the voluntary 
market in PNG. 
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analytic framework in the next section, the following three sections 
delineate the philosophy of praxis underpinning these three orientations 
in the struggle over climate governance.  
This work draws on existing case studies of corporate/state networks and 
social movement activity, as well as my observations as a researcher and 
participant in the Australian climate movement.3 The typology of 
political orientations I identify, are conceived as underpinning three core 
discourses in climate debates (see Table 1). Each of these orientations 
faces a dilemma. The hegemony of market ‘solutions’ for climate change 
mitigation is far from complete. The transnational coalition of actors 
championing carbon markets faces the challenge of legitimacy in the 
political field. The alliances of non-government organisations and 
community groups calling for climate action face the dilemma of 
compromise. Wedged between the market and the state, the strategies 
and normative agenda of this significant portion of global civil society 
appear to be tilted to the right (Carroll 2007; Lipschutz 2005), 
confirming the commitment to inadequate emissions reduction targets 
and market-based policy. Finally the more uncompromising political 
praxis of the emergent global climate justice movement faces the 
challenge of realising a popular movement with power and vision enough 
to forge a new mode of political, economic and cultural organisation. In 
the process of this examination I wage a critique of the current and 
potential trajectories of the climate movement. I conclude that the case 
for a realising a popular climate justice movement is strong. The familiar 
but augmented task for this emergent orientation lies in forging an 
encompassing and realisable transformation of political, economic and 
social structures. Rather than boast an answer to the quandaries of 
Australia’s nascent climate justice movement, I point to arenas where 
this political praxis must win the long ‘war of position’. 
                                                          
3  Over 2008 and 2009, I conducted interviews with 25 climate change activists for 
research with the Climate Action Research Project, a participatory action research 
project which includes James Goodman and Stuart Rosewarne, conducted through 
the Cosmopolitan Societies Research Centre in partnership with Friends of the 
Earth Australia. Whilst data from these interviews does not make it to this 
overview, the insights and dilemmas these people shared from their experience of 
grassroots activism, unionism and advocacy organisations are distilled into my 
discussion. The arguments made however are my own, and should not to be 
attributed to the participants, a consensus in the movement or within Friends of the 
Earth. 
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Contestation and the Politics of Climate Regulation 
Between the premise (economic structure) and the consequence 
(political organisation), relations are by no means simple and 
direct; and it is not only by economic facts that the history of 
people can be documented. It is a complex and confusing task to 
unravel its causes and in order to do so, a deep and widely 
diffused study of all spiritual and practical activities is needed. 
(Gramsci 1958, cited in Bobbio 1979: 33). 
Taking a lead from economic sociology, I start from the assumption that 
traditional economic analyses of market formation are incomplete 
(Fligstein & Dauter 2007; Granovetter 1985; Lie 1997). The market is 
ill-defined in neoclassical approaches ‘shorn of social relations, 
institutions or technology and devoid of elementary sociological 
concerns such as power, norms and networks’ (Lie 1997: 342). 
Favouring universal assumptions of rationality, the neoclassical 
economic approach does not tell us about the complexities of social and 
political relations underpinning carbon markets, from formation to 
operation. The following discussion investigates the social and political 
relations that make markets possible, or in many cases probable. A neo-
Gramscian account of power and contestation is used here to bring focus 
to the discussion. 
This paper draws initially on the work of David Levy, Peter Newell and 
Matthew Paterson who have produced an admirable set of empirical 
investigations into climate governance addressing the hegemony of 
market-based regulation, taking a neo-Gramscian approach (Levy 1997; 
Levy & Egan 2003; Levy & Newell 2005; Newell 2000, 2005, 2008a, 
2008b; Newell & Paterson 1998, 2009, 2010). The majority of this 
scholarship, however, is focused singularly on business actors, enlisting a 
rather benign and instrumental view of corporate strategy, and these 
days, only occasionally a reflection on counter hegemonic forces. For 
instance, Paterson (2009) has recently put forward the thesis that 
‘resistance makes markets’, commenting rather vaguely on the ways in 
which contestation over forest offsets in particular has contributed to 
corporate strategies of legitimation (e.g. voluntary offset standard 
initiatives from 2007 onwards). What is not explicated is, in Gramsci’s 
terms, the exact philosophies of praxis and elements of civil society 
contended to corroborate, rather than undo the climate change market 
hegemony (1971: 235). If this claim is to be substantiated, the social 
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relations that make markets possible, including a more disaggregated 
view of civil society, must be made apparent. 
My observation in regards to Newell, Paterson and Levy’s work is not a 
blanket dismissal. Indeed, they have accounted for a range of non-
government organisations and social movement forms over the years. 
Rather, this paper is an attempt to propel a point of departure for 
Gramscian analysis of contestation and climate change more critically 
and productively engaged with the questions of organising for social and 
political change (a neglected endeavour in both the climate governance 
literature, and neo-Gramscian international relations scholarship more 
generally; see Saurin 2008).  
I propose an explicit engagement between Gramscian scholarship and the 
social movements that are seeking transformatory political change from 
below. Gramsci’s formulation of the ‘organic intellectual’ underlines 
knowledge production as dialectically bound up in historical processes. 
For both Marx and Gramsci, the construction of a social ontology is 
essential for uncovering latent revolutionary possibilities (Rupert 1993). 
In Gramsci’s words, this work is necessarily part of a struggle to replace 
'common sense' ideologies maintaining the social order with 'good sense'. 
His philosophy of praxis was the pursuit of theoretical and practical 
unity; there is no theory without practice in the historical materialist 
tradition (Gramsci 1971: 364, 440-446). I am thus offering a modest 
contribution to a potential new hegemony, beginning from key 
preoccupations of the climate justice movement, that is, the disorderly 
march toward carbon market creation, and the imperative to realise 
alternative forms of social organisation. The ideas here are intended to 
inform the strategic and phenomenological quandaries facing climate 
movements. By uncovering the modalities of hegemony and counter 
hegemony underpinning the climate debate I have sought to contribute to 
already ongoing reflection in the movement. 
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) was a Marxist philosopher, journalist, 
political organiser for the Communist Party of Italy and a prisoner during 
the Mussolini fascist regime. His vocabulary for hegemony (inverted 
from Lenin’s original use of the term), and unique formulation of civil 
society has inspired a range of global political economy scholars seeking 
an antidote to the orthodoxy of realism. He offered a dynamic conception 
of politics, explaining the dual nature of hegemony in a way that 
accounts for the resilience of capitalist social arrangements. For Gramsci, 
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‘the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 
“domination” and as “intellectual and moral leadership”’ (Gramsci 1971: 
57). The basis for hegemony then – an historic bloc – not only enjoys 
power through coercion (the realists’ instrumental power), but via 
epistemic and cultural dimensions of social life (Gill 2008). In turn, 
systems of rule or social order spring forth from the active and passive 
consensus of civil society forged over time. Civil society is both a site of 
consensual legitimation and contestation. The questions that arise from 
this relate to the operations of hegemony and counter hegemony on all 
scales of the global political economy, and thus call for a dynamic 
understanding of collective agency and grounded analyses of the material 
sites, actors and ideas involved in contestation. 
Gramscian conceptions of power and agency allow us to make sense of 
ways certain actions and epistemologies come to permeate social and 
political life in complex, often unpredictable and contested ways (Gill 
1995a: 402). Realisation of agency for Gramsci lies in the struggle 
between different collectivities in the political process. Hegemony is not 
easily exercised, nor is it static. Consensus must run the gauntlet of 
ongoing struggle between competing ideological, theoretical and political 
projects (Gill 2008). 
[The] process of historical unification takes place through the 
disappearance of the internal contradictions which tear apart 
human society, while these contradictions themselves are the 
condition for the formation of groups and for the birth of 
ideologies which are not concretely universal but are immediately 
rendered transient by the practical origin of their substance 
(Gramsci 1971: 445). 
Gramsci’s formulation figures collective action as the basis of social 
structures as well as their contestation and transformation (the long ‘war 
of position’), conceiving history and social change as a continual, 
cumulative, but non-repetitive process (Gill 2008: 17). Moreover, the 
military metaphor serves to construe the operation of power not just in 
terms of constituent parts to the political field (actors, institutions and 
ideas), but the entire arrangement of relations between them. Pursuing an 
analysis of the arrangement of social forces brings hope, but as will be 
demonstrated, not wishful thinking. Struggle is a dialectical process. 
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Amidst the struggle over climate governance I wage a critique of the 
status quo and apply a dose of wilful optimism.4  
It is assumed here that the dialectical argumentation we bear witness to 
in climate debates is grounded in material conditions, reflecting 
historical-material processes, not singularly a contest of ideas. In other 
words, ‘hegemony has ontological depth’ (Carroll 2006: 11). I inquire 
into the material bases for forms of agency in the political field, 
investigating the agential capacity of social formations to reconfigure 
social relations beyond those which bind collective responses to climate 
change to the logics of emissions-intensive capital accumulation. Three 
prevailing forms of political praxis are construed to be in a long ‘war of 
position’ having co-constituted the impasse in climate governance we are 
now witness to. The orientations are based on three dominant forms of 
discourse waged in the climate debate: climate markets, climate action 
and climate justice (see Table 1). They are analysed according to four 
constitutive elements: epistemology, actors, philosophy of praxis and 
agency. These elements are delineated as a means to lay bare the material 
foundations of hegemony and counter hegemony. I propose each mode of 
contestation faces possibilities and dilemmas in realising its political 
project. The dilemmas present as much as a hindrance as they are a 
blessing, best understood as productive tensions wherein strategic and 
sometimes new forms of transformatory philosophies of praxis are born 
(Goodman 2009; Maddison & Scalmer 2006).  
Climate Markets 
The pervasive pursuit of market-based solutions to climate change rests 
on the logics of neoliberalism; the primary assumption being that 
privatisation, commodification and marketisation of ecological systems 
are optimal means of conservation (Castree 2008: 147). As a policy 
preference, the advocates of market solutions suppose climate change 
(indeed, all ecological problems) ‘can be solved by the creation and 
enforcement of tradeable property rights in environmental 'goods' and 
'bads'’ (Eckersley 1993: 4). We see this play out in the common 
                                                          
4  I am of course making reference here to Gramsci’s much quoted slogan from the 
masthead of his journal L’ordine Nuovo ‘pessimism of the intellect, optimism of 
the will’.  
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assumption that putting a price on carbon is essential and fundamental to 
mitigation (e.g. key OECD government sponsored economic analyses 
make this assertion, Garnaut 2008; Stern 2007). Using the price system 
to incentivise lower emissions production and consumption is purported 
to be able to deliver the most cost efficient ecological outcome. 
Analyses, such as Stern’s and Garnaut’s, are waged at the expense of 
considering alternative measures. In rhetorical terms, it is understood as a 
preference for market mechanisms, rather than direct state intervention. 
 
Table 1: Political Orientations in the Struggle Over Climate Change 
Climate markets Climate action Climate justice
Epistemology
Climate change as market 
externality
Climate change as institutional and 
technological failure
Climate change reflects internal 
relation between exploitation of 
nature and people
Policy
Market-based regulation and 
voluntary agreements
Often agnostic on role of the market  
International UN treaty                     
Rejection of market mechanisms in 
favour of post-capitalist economic, 
political and cultural re-organisation
Actors
Transnational networks of corporate, 
state, international institution and        
civil society actors
National and transnational networks 
of NGOs and community groups
Transnational networks of social 
movement organisations, 
autonomous collectives and some 
Latin American states
Philosophy of praxis
Accumulation by decarbonisation       Climate cosmopolitanism                
Global climate justice from below       
Eco-sufficiency    
Agency
New constitutionalism
Civil society between state and 
market; politics via markets




On the broadest level, we can understand the hegemonic preference for 
climate markets in the context of shifting norms and agency bound up in 
the reorganisation of the global economy from the 1970s (Newell & 
Paterson 2009). The restructuring of global production in this period is 
connected to the onset of a third technical-industrial revolution and the 
emerging transnational power of capital (Gill 1995b). After the float of 
the US dollar 1971, and in the wake of oil shocks in 1973 and 1979, and 
high levels of debt in industrialised nations, a visible swing to the right 
took place in the struggle to establish causes for the West’s woes (Newell 
& Paterson 2009). The ensuing political project is now commonly known 
as neoliberalism, observed to have been led by UK Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher, US President Ronald Reagan, an influential group 
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economists at the University of Chicago, key state agencies (treasury 
departments and central banks) and the International Monetary Fund 
(MF), World Bank and World Trade Organisation (WTO) (for a concise 
overview see Harvey 2005). This ideological contest waged against 
Soviet-style socialism and Keynesianism fuelled the shift away from the 
post-war compromise of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982). The 
reform agenda was based on a commitment to deregulation and 
privatisation of formerly public infrastructure and institutions, supported 
by the simultaneous discursive shift toward the language of market 
efficiency and state retreat. This served to consolidate the power of 
capital, reformulate the nation-state,5 the nature of regulation, and 
stimulated the disaggregation of the Left (Saad-Filho & Ayers 2008).  
Neoliberal hegemony is evident in the architectures of climate 
governance (Newell & Paterson 1998, 2009, 2010). Market-based 
policies for emissions mitigation are infused into the Kyoto Protocol, 
Copenhagen Accord and all national legislation already installed and 
currently debated. Most certainly, these forms of regulation have realised 
their status as the commonsense compromise palatable to the deeply 
reluctant resource sector. Amenable resource sector firms came around to 
the carbon market agenda in Europe and then the US as the pressure for 
an international response to climate change intensified (Meckling 
                                                          
5  Although rhetoric of minimal state intervention is a hallmark of this political 
orientation, the state has not retreated. Whilst it is tempting to discern the global 
predilection for market-based responses to climate change as a triumph of the 
market over the state, we must not forget the central role nation-states play in 
market creation (Engels 2006). Market creation entails rule-making and 
intervention by states albeit alongside other actors in networks that transcend both 
national boundaries and international negotiations (ibid.: 332). This is particularly 
true of emissions trading. Cap-and-trade systems require a state, international or 
corporate body to legislate a cap on emissions. Thus, a second, contradictory logic 
of those advocating market solutions to climate change pertains to the state. 
Ecosystems inevitably come under state directives because of their centrality to 
economic and social reproduction (Castree 2008: 148). The sustained role of the 
state in market creation demonstrates the mismatch between the normative content 
of neoliberalism and its practice. Gramsci anticipated this contradiction noting that 
‘laissez-faire too is a form of state “regulation” introduced and maintained by 
legislative and coercive means’ (Gramsci 1971: 160). Understanding the 
reconfigured (but not diminished) role of the state is crucial to our understanding 
of neoliberalism (Cahill 2009).  
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2008).6 Corporate voluntarism from this sector shaped the emissions 
trading agenda and market architectures to a significant degree. The first 
emissions trading schemes experimented with in Europe were corporate 
in origin. British Petroleum (BP) and Shell installed in-house emissions 
trading schemes in 1998 and 2000 respectively. These initiatives helped 
to foreclose the European debate over carbon taxation and legitimise 
emissions trading.  
Of course it should be remembered that these initiatives were second 
order to the preceding pro-active campaign waged by the infamous 
Global Climate Coalition (GCC), of which both BP and Shell were both 
members. The GCC fanned climate scepticism and motivated the US 
departure from the Kyoto Protocol (Gelbspan 2005). In Australia, the 
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (AIGN) was an equivalent 
epicentre for the resource sector campaign against any form of climate 
regulation (Pearse 2007, 2009). After concerted criticism of these tactics 
from all corners of the left, resource sector firms continue more subtle 
campaigns against the prospect of meaningful state intervention into their 
industries via peak lobbying organisations, such as the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), and in Australia, the 
Minerals Council of Australia. As with the examples of BP and Shell, 
emissions-intensive corporations are increasing involvement with pilot 
carbon offset programs (see below). The resource sector seems to be 
waging a multifarious campaign supporting market-based mechanisms 
for climate change where politically necessary. 
Foundations of the market orientation were carried with normative 
weight by economists, state agencies and to a lesser extent, 
environmental NGOs particularly in the US. A watershed in 
environmental regulation occurred in 1988, when the UK Environment 
Department commissioned a report on climate change impacts and policy 
options with the aim of providing a response to the Brundtland report. 
The ‘Pearce Report’ titled Blueprint for a Green Economy was highly 
influential in its advocacy for market mechanisms (Pearce 2005; Pearce, 
                                                          
6  North America was a site of original visions for pollution markets. It is here that 
the first experiments in pollution trading were installed. The 1990 US federal 
Clean Air Act amendment included provisions for emissions trading, resulting in 
the first compliance scheme for sulphur dioxide trading. As is frequently cited, the 
supposed success of these schemes inspired US delegates to propose emissions 
trading to the 1996 UNFCCC negotiations. 
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Markandya & Barbier 1989). It championed a move away from so-called 
‘command-and-control measures’ toward market-based policy for 
environmental problems. Economist David Pearce himself notes ‘the 
presence of [market-based] measures is a remarkable testament to the 
influence of environmental economists on policy, and to the 
receptiveness of civil servants and politicians’ to new ideas’ (Pearce 
2006: 150). Think tanks in industrialised countries (particularly the US 
and UK) have likewise played a central role in promoting the market 
agenda (Beder 1996, 2001).  
Meanwhile, state agencies in the US and UK have been instrumental in 
the application of these ideas (Braun 2008). In practice, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States was a key 
bureau within which market-based policy for environmental pollution 
was trialled, legitimated and institutionalised. Stephen Gill’s notion of 
‘new constitutionalism’ captures much of what is related here. New 
constitutionalism refers to the ‘varied and complex efforts, especially by 
the forces of the political right and those of neoclassical economists and 
financial capital, to develop a politico-legal framework for the 
reconstitution of capital on a world scale, and thus for the intensification 
of market forms of discipline’ (Gill 1992, 1995b: 78). Gill has captured 
the implicit, but macro-political processes by which this historic bloc 
seek to shape international institutions and secure the logical parameters 
of global governance as deference to the god of market efficiency (Gill 
2008). Carbon market advocacy and installation presents as an extension 
of this mode of hegemony. 
The support of the large environmental non-government organisations 
(ENGOs), notably the US Environmental Defense Fund and the Nature 
Conservancy, also played a role in substantiating the legitimacy of 
emissions trading both in the US and later Europe (Braun 2008; 
Meckling 2008). The Environmental Defense Fund partnered with BP in 
the installation of its in-house emissions trading scheme in 1997, 
contributing to the corporation’s post-GCC green image (Victor & House 
2006). More recently, the US Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) – a 
coalition of twenty-four companies and four ENGOs7 –   was formed in 
                                                          
7  The full list of members are as follows: AES, Alcoa, Alstom, Boston Scientific 
Corporation, Chrysler, The Dow Chemical Company, Duke Energy, DuPont, 
Environmental Defense Fund, Exelon Corporation, Ford Motor Company, General 
Electric, General Motors Company, Honeywell,  Johnson & Johnson, Natural 
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2007. USCAP, of which the Environmental Defense Fund, Nature 
Conservancy, Pew Centre on Global Climate Change and World 
Resources Institute are members, lobbies for market based regulation for 
climate change. These large organisations continue to build and profit 
from carbon market initiatives. For example, in 2008, the Nature 
Conservancy partnered with American Electricity Power (AEP), 
Pacificorp, BP and the Bolivian government in a pilot REDD8 project, 
the contentious Noel Kempff Climate Action Project.9 The World 
Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) is another key player. It is a partner in 
the Gold Standard carbon offsets accreditation program and profits from 
offset projects such as the Amazon Region Protected Areas pilot forest 
REDD scheme in Brazil. 
The Australian ENGO’s response to the pursuit of a global carbon 
market has been similar. Since the early 1990s peak environment groups 
have been supportive of market-based mechanisms (proposing either a 
carbon tax or emissions trading) for climate change mitigation. Some of 
the most visible and popular organisations (the Australian arm of the 
WWF, the Australian Conservation Council (ACF) and Greenpeace) 
have pursued corporate partnerships (Doyle 2000). This approach has 
significantly constrained the work of these organisations within a 
                                                                                                                      
Resources Defense Council, NextEra Energy, NRG Energy, PepsiCo, Pew Center 
on Global Climate Change, PG&E Corporation, PNM Resources, Rio Tinto, Shell, 
Siemens Corporation, The Nature Conservancy, Weyerhaeuser and the World 
Resources Institute (USCAP undated). 
8  The policy terminology for this track of the negotiations is Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD). 
REDD schemes create projects to conserve forest land that would otherwise be 
subject to forestry or other land use changes leading to forest degradation. It is 
understood as creating ‘carbon sinks’. Creating a UN framework for REDD with 
market-based funding is the one thing ‘stakeholders’ in climate governance are 
reaching consensus over. That is, REDD projects are likely to create carbon offset 
credits saleable to firms in Northern nations who have, or will, install emissions 
trading schemes to meet emissions reduction requirements under the UNFCCC. In 
reality, the REDD offset market is being built on three fronts: in the UN, proxy 
inter-state dealing making and the voluntary initiatives undertaken by state, 
corporate and civil society actors such as the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project. 
9  The credits generated by expanding a Bolivian National Park are to be sold in the 
voluntary market via the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), and has been 
heralded as a model for future REDD projects (The Nature Conservancy undated). 
Recent analysis from Greenpeace International puts both the ecological and social 
claims of this project into question (Densham et al. 2009). 
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neoliberal agenda, albeit in different ways and to differing degrees 
(Rosewarne 2003).10 The decision of WWF, the ACF and Climate 
Institute to support the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) in 
April 2009 highlighted the collusion of key ENGOs with the market 
agenda.  
A cohort of carbon entrepreneurs have nested into the architectures of 
climate governance, realising their political project by rolling out often 
pre-emptive institutional arrangements. In particular, the emergent 
material power of the global financial sector from the 1990s has played 
out in the progression of climate governance. This sector is the emerging 
centre of this historic bloc (Newell & Paterson 2010). A key form of 
corporate strategy waged by the financial sector actors involves 
initiatives of (often pre-emptive) voluntary governance11 and 
engagement in public-private partnerships (PPPs). The World Bank’s 
Prototype Carbon Fund is the archetypal PPP. It has served the dual 
purpose of carbon market advocacy as well as being an implementation 
network for the UN Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)12 
(Bäckstrand 2008; Streck 2004). This transnational network of six states 
and seventeen corporations developed some of the first CDM projects 
and has paved the way for a spate of such partnerships in the slow, 
unruly drift toward carbon markets. Meanwhile global networks of 
financial sector actors are vocal in the political process, pursuing the 
market agenda through sustained lobbying efforts. The International 
                                                          
10  For example, there is a contrast between the WWF’s increase in state funding 
between 1990 and 2003 (Hamilton & Macintosh 2004), compared to the decline 
the ACF experienced. 
11  Voluntary initiatives constitute a significant portion of market operations 
including, for example: organized marketplaces (e.g. European Climate Exchange, 
Chicago Climate Exchange and the Montréal Exchange), and firms offering 
verification services, derivatives and insurance for traded permits (Bumpus & 
Liverman 2008; Stern 2007) . There is no room here to adequately cover the range 
of governance architectures used in the carbon market. See Bumpus and Liverman 
(2008) for an examination of the UN-administered and voluntary offset markets. 
Stripple & Lövbrand (2010) also offer an excellent review of the CDM market. 
12  The CDM was originally conceived of as a fund for sustainable development, but 
has been marketised in the process of negotiations. Projects are created by either 
state or corporate actors to produce Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) that 
count toward an Annex I nation’s mitigation targets. The CDM operates between 
developing (non Annex I) nations and developed countries (Annex I). In 2008, the 
primary market was valued at US$6.5 billion, but contracted severely (by 59%) to 
US$2.7 billion in 2009 (Capoor & Ambrosi 2009; Kossoy & Ambrosi 2010).  
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Emissions Trading Association (IETA), for instance, is an association of 
174 firms with an interest in the carbon market. It is highly influential in 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) negotiations and was crucial in the retention of international 
commitment to emissions trading after the US withdrawal in 2001 
(Newell & Paterson 2009). 
However, the carbon market is not an easily realised project. The future 
of proposed market mechanisms for climate mitigation is uncertain in 
key OECD nations including the United States, Japan, Canada and 
Australia. Debates in these nations have been waged fiercely, with 
contestation reflecting deep seated tensions over economic growth, 
international cooperation, responsibility and distributive justice. The 
dismal status of international negotiations over a binding Post-Kyoto 
agreement means a key mechanism for guaranteeing market demand and 
supply is in serious doubt. Kyoto although nonbinding, remains an 
essential normative tool with which emissions trading markets harness 
power and legitimacy. The legitimacy of carbon markets has been 
questioned within the UNFCCC and outside it. Actions of the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Americas (ALBA)13 alongside Tuvalu and the Alliance 
of Small Island States (AOSIS) in Copenhagen present as signs of 
disaggregating, but potentially strengthening, power in the South and a 
move away from the dominant agenda of Organisation of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the G77. Likewise, the emergent climate 
justice movement has contested carbon markets at key sites across the 
globe (see the penultimate section of this paper).  
Finally, the Australian debate over climate policy is a prime example of 
the shifting ground of climate politics. Organised dissent against the 
CPRS (from the right, and the left to a lesser extent) has triumphed at 
least temporarily. Abbott’s ascension to Liberal leadership and 
inflammation of the debate with anti-tax rhetoric figured as the most 
powerful interjection. Aided no doubt by the failing international 
commitment to a post-Kyoto agreement and Rudd’s inability to 
following through on the social democratic flourish underpinning the 
former government’s commitment to emissions trading or the more 
progressive, though not climate change oriented, Resource Super Profits 
Tax. Meanwhile, the Australian Green Party’s position that the CPRS 
                                                          
13  Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador. 
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was ‘worse than doing nothing’ played a significant role in contesting the 
corporate capture and ecological vagaries of cap-and-trade. The resultant 
status quo has resulted in a debate wholly confused about what it is we 
are debating. Prime Minister Gillard wants to form a consensus, though 
on what, remains unclear. Marius Kloppers, CEO of BHP has warmed to 
a carbon tax (Lee 2010). Abbott continues the anti-tax rhetoric. The 
Greens are currently calling for a ‘carbon price’ (read carbon tax or cap-
and-trade?) with the majority of the climate change movement agreeing, 
save one socialist organisation and a network of climate justice activists 
with which I am affiliated. 
Despite the continued commitment to the climate market agenda, we 
might optimistically maintain that in 2010 a little space opened up to 
rethink the parameters of climate politics. At the very least the activities 
of state, corporate and civil society building the climate market agenda 
when taken together are incoherent in some respects, and therefore 
contestable. Those would-be champions of climate markets have not 
secured a hegemonic economic, political, moral and intellectual unity in 
the process of contestation (Gramsci 1971: 181-182).  
In light of these fluid formations, I now turn to the second question of 
this work: is there any space to realise non-market alternatives for 
climate change mitigation? Put another way, what forms do counter-
hegemonic forces take, and what is their potential? There are two 
contrasting political orientations visible in the climate movement, 
identifiable by two distinct types of discourse: climate action and climate 
justice.14 These two bents are investigated keeping in mind the challenge 
                                                          
14  The ensuing discussion is particularly informed by my observations of the 
Australian climate movement. The distinction made between political orientations 
of ‘climate action’ and ‘climate justice’ is not easily substantiated, not least of all 
because of the diversity of movement praxis within and between groups. However, 
it presents as a common nominal distinction made by climate activists particularly 
in Australia, Northern America and Europe. In Australia climate action is the 
preferred discourse for ENGOs and the network of ‘Climate Action Groups’. A 
similar partition became evident within social movements at the Copenhagen 
UNFCCC between the ENGO-led tck tck tck campaign and the Reclaim Power 
protest. And in 2010 an exchange between the 1 Sky initiative led by Bill 
McKibben among others and a host of climate justice collectives who figured their 
political project in contrast to the former organisation’s tendency toward 
professionalised, policy-oriented reform campaigns (see both open letters, Bailey 
et al. 2010; Wood 2010). In light of this, grouping movement activities and 
networks along these lines is much neater than division according to organisational 
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at hand, the imperative to finding openings for change that do not lead to 
co-optive capture whilst simultaneously building constituencies on the 
ground (Carroll 2007: 39). Networks organising for climate action and 
for climate justice each face dilemmas in the process of contestation. 
Both grapple with the task of organising for social and political change, 
albeit with differing predispositions. There is an open question waged 
throughout the remainder of this work asking how might these 
orientations meet and potentially realise common strategic visions? 
Climate Action 
Climate action presents in the political field as an orientation seeking 
instrumental institutional goals, that is, either creation or reform of 
institutional mechanisms in the order of national and international 
cooperation over decarbonisation. Those who use this phrase in the 
process of contestation are invariably calling for a binding international 
treaty with strong aggregate international and national emissions 
reduction targets. In addition, climate action advocates frequently focus 
on the urgency of climate change drawing parallels to state mobilisation 
of resources during the World Wars.  
Climate governance has not only taken shape alongside the emergent 
power of transnational capital, but also the organisation of professional 
transnational interest groups from the 1990s (Goodman 2007; Josselin & 
Wallace 2001). The discourse of climate action originated within the 
advocacy work of non-governmental organisations on national and 
international levels. Thus the political and tactical agendas often 
associated with this orientation can be in part understood in reference to 
the increasing professionalization of social action on climate change. 
Among the hundreds of international NGOs seeking sway over global 
governance, environmental organisations have emerged and consolidated 
over the past 25 years, particularly in the urban centres of the global 
North. They include the World Resources Institute, WWF, Sierra Club, 
Nature Conservancy, Greenpeace and an umbrella alliance created in 
1989, the International Climate Action Network (ICAN). In the previous 
section, I discussed the explicit legitimating role some of these 
                                                                                                                      
form or ideology only. The summary provided here is intended as a grounded 
analytic frame to inform further sociological investigation. 
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organisations have played in market-oriented climate governance. At 
other moments and sites in the contestation over climate change, peak 
groups lead the way in reformist agendas less obviously supportive of the 
market agenda. 
The national and transnational networks of ENGOs and community 
groups orienting around this discourse are agnostic, or perhaps more 
rightly understood as ambivalent about the role of market mechanisms 
for climate mitigation, most of the time favouring the win-win logic of 
ecological modernisation (Hajer 1995). Ecological modernisation is a 
concept used to capture a normative trend in environmental politics 
which rests on the assumption that the ‘external costs’ of capitalism and 
the industrial system can be internalised into existing institutional and 
economic structures (Mol, Sonnenfeld & Spaargaren 2009). Actors who 
carry the ecological modernisation project seek to invert the logic of 
opposition between the prevailing economic order and ecological values, 
recapitulating ecological issues as an opportunity for continued profit. 
ENGOs have played a role in creating public expectation and backing for 
state responses to climate change in Northern industrialised countries for 
the most part. To a lesser extent ENGOs have set the terms of the debate 
beyond acceptance of the need to act (Newell 2000). In a tangled web of 
cause and effect, the better resourced and institutionalised ENGOs have 
tended to operate within, and substantiate the techno-managerial 
suppositions of climate governance. In doing so, ENGOs fail to contest 
the neoliberal construction of nature, that is, seeing nature itself as a 
marketplace, where optimal resource use and market value are purported 
to find common cause (Doyle 2000, 2010; Goldman 1998b, 2001). Thus 
the discourse of climate action campaigning for ‘strong targets’, ‘climate 
solutions’ and ‘clean technologies’ belies a political strategy that seeks 
seemingly neutral ground in the process of contestation, away from more 
radical confrontations and ideological overtones.  
The plethora of NGO published reports meticulously detailing potential 
energy scenarios are important means of making the normative case for 
decarbonisation (e.g. Saddler, Diesendorf & Denniss 2004; Teske & 
Vincent 2008; Wright & Hearps 2010). The epistemology behind this 
orientation owes much to the disciplines of science, economics and 
engineering. However, establishing the existence of technical capabilities 
often begs bigger political questions concerning the nature and extent of 
reform sought after. The recent Beyond Zero Emissions report for 
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instance claims it is neither anti-growth nor anti-business (Manning 
2010), and again we see the logic of ecological modernisation emerge. 
Their reasoning is explicitly geared toward the technical problem as they 
see it, assuming the political agenda will flow from there. The bold 
vision for decarbonisation raises the question how might government 
agencies be moved to mobilise resources (an estimated $37 billion a year 
for 10 years)? And how might the intimate state/capital connections be at 
least reformed? Meanwhile, the silence in reference to the market agenda 
is deafening.  
At the grassroots of the climate movement in Australia15 there is also a 
kind of complicity with the carbon market agenda, though admittedly the 
seeming political middle ground has certainly contributed to the popular 
appeal of this movement in industrialised countries in the mid-2000s. 
The central focus of the national network of community groups (titled 
Climate Action Groups or CAGS) across Australia in 2009 was 
participation in a transnational initiative led by US environmentalist Bill 
McKibben. 350.org inspired community groups to build an international 
symbolic campaign in the lead up to the UNFCCC COP15. The 
campaign policy sought an international binding emissions target in the 
Post-Kyoto treaty.16 It is an impressive exercise in the global political 
imaginary, bringing the challenge posed to us by climate science into a 
significant array of locations, into people’s lives via collective 
mobilisations. The need to stabilise emissions is harnessed to mobilise on 
a universal basis – perhaps also understood as a latent expression of 
global climate justice. However, the potential for the 350ppm signifier to 
mobilise either states or a transnational movement beyond moments of 
symbolic protest is fraught. Evocative of cosmopolitan politics, this form 
of political praxis is challenged in locating its global citizenry in the local 
jurisdictions struggle over how climate change must be waged. 
                                                          
15  In the last four years a climate movement has emerged that is distinct from the 
Australian environment movement. It includes many individuals (predominantly 
from white middle class backgrounds) who have been politically mobilised for the 
first time. The formation of what is now approximately 80 active local Climate 
Action Groups was initially supported by state Conservation Councils. 
16  On an international day of climate action, they produced 5,200 events capturing 
images of people signifying the number 350 in more than 180 countries and held 
silent vigils in Copenhagen and across the world in December. In Australia, 
Climate Action Groups, GetUp and the Nature Conservation Councils 
enthusiastically took up the project. 
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On the whole, those calling for climate action rarely raise the questions 
of economic growth, the veracity of market-regulation, or the inequalities 
bound up with climate change. On the question of the carbon market 
there is striking ambivalence. In 2009, the climate action movement was 
all but silent on the emissions trading debate. Interestingly, there has 
been some internal debate over emissions trading in the movement. The 
national Climate Action Summit at the beginning of that year saw the 
movement network commit to ensuring the CPRS would not become law 
at its national meeting, but refrained from taking an in-principle stand 
against emissions trading.17 In 2010 the network voted to reject 
emissions trading outright. In addition, however, the network agreed on a 
national campaign goal to install a price on carbon. Limited discussion 
has occurred over the likelihood that the Greens’ former and likely future 
proposal to set an interim price on carbon based on the CPRS structure is 
compatible with the Labor government’s continued, albeit faltering, 
commitment to an emissions trading scheme.  
In sum, the logic and politics of climate action are limited by an over-
insistence on instrumentality and an uncritical view to existing 
institutional arrangements. I have suggested that this is due to the 
resistance on behalf of ENGOs and community groups to position 
themselves politically. Five Greenpeace activists scaled the Sydney 
Opera House during the Copenhagen UNFCCC meeting to drop a banner 
reading ‘Stop the politics, climate treaty now’ (Kwek 2009). The 
question to be asked is not how might the politics of the UN climate 
regime be stopped, but what kind of politics will forge the new trajectory 
needed? In the spirit of putting two forms of praxis in conversation with 
one another, I make the case for the climate justice orientation though I 
am not uncritical or unrealistic about this part of the movement’s 
potential. Thus I proceed with caution. Gramsci acknowledged the 
ambiguity to resistance and refuted determinist explanations of false 
consciousness (Mittelman & Chin 2005). We can understand the climate 
(action) movement’s ambivalent relationship to the question of carbon 
markets, as part of the process of contestation itself. The former critique 
is not intended to propose the politics of climate action and its advocates 
are misled, suffering Marx’s false consciousness. Gramsci had something 
to say on this:  
                                                          
17  In 2009 and 2010 the network came together for a national Summit, where 
participants develop shared goals and campaigns. 
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If one applies one’s will to the creation of a new equilibrium 
among the forces which really exist and are operative – basing 
oneself on the particular force which one believes to be 
progressive and strengthening it to help it to victory – one still 
moves in the terrain of effective reality, but does so in order to 
dominate and transcend it (or to contribute to this). What ‘ought 
to be’ is therefore concrete; indeed it is the only realistic and 
historicist interpretation of reality, it alone is history in the 
making and philosophy in the making, it alone is politics. 
(Gramsci 1971: 172) 
I acknowledge the undesirability of ideological purism, but am aware of 
the need to find another trajectory. As a contribution to a new 
equilibrium then, I explore the possibilities and dilemmas of climate 
justice.  
Climate Justice 
A new paradigm for radical critique of market-oriented climate 
governance has emerged, born of the movements for global and 
environmental justice, and harbouring a fresh set of potentials and 
dilemmas (Goodman 2009). Climate justice refers to a philosophy of 
praxis that envisions economic, political and cultural re-organisation. In 
many cases, but not all, the political change sought after presents as calls 
for post-capitalist (indeed post-patriarchy and post-colonial) 
transformation. The climate justice movement is a transnational network 
of social movement organisations, autonomous collectives and more 
recently involving alliance with two Latin American states (Bolivia and 
Venezuela). Those who organise for climate justice have taken up two 
interwoven agendas, one reactive, one proactive. Firstly, they seek to 
refute, resist and ultimately undermine the technological redecoration of 
fossil fuels and market-oriented ‘false solutions’ to climate change that 
aggravate rather than resolve the iniquitous causes and effects of climate 
change. Secondly, a positive agenda is sought so that not only is the 
hegemony of market solutions stripped away, but a new political, 
economic and cultural organisation of society is made possible.  
Alongside the transnational proliferation of corporate power in the 
1990s, and the emergence of (institutionalised) global civil society, 
global resistance movements more firmly planted on the ground have 
186     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 66 
arisen. Two overlapping philosophies of praxis have emerged: 
environmental justice18 and global justice. They have shared ethics 
resting upon reclamation of the commons in the face of corporate 
globalisation (Goldman 1998a; Klein 2004). In contrast to the one-
dimensional notion of the commons in liberal political theory and 
economics, the commons for global justice activists is material and 
symbolic, multi-scaled and dynamic (Goldman 1998a). This informed 
the multi-pronged strategy of this movement of movements. 
Accordingly, anti-dam activists in the Narmada Valley of India, peasant 
farmers in Thailand fighting water and land hungry golf courses, urban 
Europeans Reclaiming the Streets with carnival-style protest and mining 
protestors the world over have each been challenging the same forces 
behind relentless commodification and eco-social enclosure on multiple 
axes (Johnston 2006).  
These networks waned in the post-September 11 world, and perhaps 
under the weight of their own radical pluralism. But they have since been 
reinvigorated in climate justice campaigns, focused upon the carbon-
intense sources of climate change and the markets that protect them. 
Echoing the praxis of justice globalism, climate justice assumes that 
current political and social structures can be transformed through 
collective prefigurative politics (Carroll 2007). By extension, the climate 
crisis also brings a new generative potential. The confrontation between 
capital accumulation and ecological survival creates a universal 
imperative to live differently (Goodman 2009).  
Civil disobedience at the emissions-intensive sites in the North marks a 
politics of refusal. ‘Direct action’ taken to halt the operations of coal 
mines, coal ports, airports, and the European Climate Exchange at 
Climate Camps disrupts the everyday permanence of polluting industry, 
albeit for no more than a day. The first Climate Camp was held in 2006 
at Drax coal-fired power station in Yorkshire, a second at London 
                                                          
18  Environmental justice emerged in the US from community mobilisation against 
toxic pollution disproportionately dispersed in poor indigenous and African 
American communities. Environmental justice activists connected environmental 
degradation to the social and political grievances evoked by the civil rights 
movement (Pezzullo & Sandler 2007). Into the 1990s, environmental justice 
movements in the North and South forged transnational networks. They insisted 
ecological issues should be taken up in conjunction with struggle against the local 
injustice that trails the operations of transnational resource companies and pose a 
challenge to the capitalist growth economy (Pellow & Brulle 2005). 
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Heathrow airport in 2007, and a third at Kingsnorth power station 2008, 
and camps have since been held in over a dozen other sites across the 
world in 2009 and 2010. Climate Camps in Australia have targeted coal 
expansion for national consumption and export at Newcastle coal port, 
long wall coal mining for steel production in the southern coal fields of 
Sydney and retention of the Hazelwood coal-fired power station in 
Victoria. These gatherings of usually 1000-2000 people fall far short of 
posing a structural challenge to polluting industries. Nonetheless, they 
are a generative site for not only instrumental action, but movement 
building and strategising.19 Indeed, in Australia Climate Camps are 
moments where the orientations climate action and climate justice come 
together. These sites of contestation are vital component to the struggle 
for climate justice, but not the only battle to win. 
The slow drift toward markets in tradeable carbon rights must be resisted 
head on. A network of activist-scholars, leveraging expertise and 
producing meticulous exposés uncovering the realities of carbon markets 
on the ground, supports a grassroots struggle in the South and North 
(Bond 2007). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was the 
seminal carbon market institution challenged by social movement 
collectives and critical scholars alike. With the installation of compliance 
emissions trading schemes and the 2005 ratification of Kyoto Protocol, 
the CDM was touted as a method of providing financial support for 
development in tandem with sustainable development. In response, social 
movement organisations, such as the Transnational Institute and Carbon 
Trade Watch, Sinks Watch, REDD-Monitor, FERN, Corporate Europe 
Observatory and Friends of the Earth, have revealed the promise of these 
projects to be false.20 Inch by inch they seek to undo the hegemony of 
                                                          
19  This is a central premise underpinning the Climate Action Research Project. All of 
those interviewed in the project were recruited on the basis of their having a 
connection to these events. 
20  The criticisms waged at CDM projects have highlighted the inherent injustice 
involved in offsetting continued emissions intensive activity in the North, and 
illustrate that these offsets effectively rewards carbon intensive planning and 
practice. They have questioned both the environmental efficacy of projects and the 
honesty of corporate self-monitoring, as well as roused as a deeper suspicion that 
business’ ardour for quick, short term profit can be reconciled with emissions 
reductions in the long term (e.g. Brunnengräber 2009; Gilbertson & Reyes 2009; 
Lohmann 2001, 2006; Smith 2007). Most worrying is the reported eviction of rural 
and indigenous peoples via acts of enclosing land for corporate ownership, lost 
livelihoods and the corruption of recorded mitigation data (e.g. Bachram 2004; 
188     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 66 
neoliberalism at the sites of its carbon market. These investigations 
highlight the situated, iniquitous effects of carbon markets. The epistemic 
basis of these critiques begins from a rejection of the commodification of 
nature in the first instance. Thus their efforts wage an epistemological 
challenge to the neoclassical formulations of climate change as a 
resolvable externality.  
In its search for a material basis, climate justice figures itself as 
simultaneously local and global praxis generating North/South 
solidarities along the way. In these forms of resistance we see Harvey’s 
dialectic at play between the militant particularism of lived struggle and 
times of critical distance serving to formulate global ambitions (1996: 
44). The World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights 
of Mother Earth held in April 2010 exemplifies this. The potentials and 
dilemmas involved with forging a cohesive, proactive, transformatory 
climate politics were in stark display here.  
On the 19-22 April, over 30,000 people gathered on a sports field in 
Bolivia’s Cochabamba, an alternative climate summit was held replete 
with an alternative set of agendas. Seventeen working groups undertook 
the collaborative task of fleshing out a vision and programme for climate 
justice. The event culminated in a ‘People’s Agreement’ on climate 
change. After laying out an anti-capitalist position on climate change, 
five key proposals (among others) were communicated (PWCCC 2010a): 
• The obligation of developed countries to honour their climate 
debt toward developing countries and Mother Earth. 
• A World Referendum on climate change and related issues. 
• Establishment of a UN Universal Declaration of the Rights of 
Mother Earth. 
• Establishment of an International Climate and Environmental 
Justice Tribunal. 
• The creation of a mechanism to REDD+ for the management 
and conservation of forests that is not based on the carbon 
market regime, that respects the sovereignty of states, 
                                                                                                                      
Dada 2007; Isla 2009; Reddy 2007). These trends seem certain to be repeated with 
the imminent marketisation of the UNFCCC REDD scheme (Al Jazeera 2009; 
Densham et al. 2009; Goodman & Roberts 2009; Hall 2008; Okereke & Dooley 
2010). 
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guarantees the rights and participation of indigenous peoples 
and forest dependent communities. 
There is significant potential in this vision seen through the normative 
claims for an anti-capitalist climate justice, historical responsibility and a 
critique the UN-REDD scheme as the next site of carbon market 
extension. However, the strategic content behind this vision will 
disappoint those looking for tangible and perhaps more instrumental 
objectives from the Summit (Schultz 2010).  
If we take the example of Climate Debt, a question goes begging. Which 
institution might deliver the transfer of wealth this notion implies? 
Moreover, does this formulation reduce historical responsibility to a 
financial transaction? The report of this working group alludes to larger 
questions in regards to the scale on which justice can be realised 
(PWCCC 2010b). Where do responsibilities lie? And to what extent 
could inter-state transfer of technologies and finance (however unlikely) 
deliver justice to the global South? Similar questions hold for the 
prospects of holding the proposed global referendum on climate change 
in 2011. The proposal for REDD+ can likewise be read as a commitment 
to the flawed UNFCCC process, a tactical orientation that goes highly 
contested in climate justice networks.  
In addition, the movement’s alignment with the Bolivian state brings up 
interesting questions. The Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (PAM), an 
indigenous political party hosting Working Group 18 was excluded from 
the Cochabamba conference by the Bolivian government. Mesa (table) 
18 was focused on environmental issues such as Bolivia’s continued 
resource extraction, notably oil and gas. The government refused their 
admission on the basis that these were local issues, not appropriate for 
the international summit. However, the tensions apparent do not warrant 
a dismissal of the Bolivian state’s role in building power for climate 
justice.  
The complications and potentials of social movement engagements with 
the Bolivian state are far from clear cut (Solnit 2010). Productive 
tensions like this are food for thought for those seeking evidence for 
viable post-capitalist climate hegemony. The Cochabamba conference 
has sparked movement reflection on the current prospects for actually 
existing eco-socialism, and more generally questions of  engaging with 
states and thereby what state policy and reform should be aimed for are 
being broached (e.g. Building Bridges Collective 2010; Goodman & 
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Rosewarne 2010). A familiar explanation for what is prompting these 
quandaries has been offered: contradictions exist between the discourse 
of climate justice and the material basis (Müller 2010). This juncture 
runs along two veins: the limits of state socialism and, more generally, 
the movement’s failure to institutionalise itself as force to replace 
neoliberal hegemony (ibid.). To my mind, the future task at hand will be 
realising sufficient political agency to re-vision state and inter-state 
institutions, whilst remaining in sustained struggle for climate justice 
from below. I do not have answers to this familiar bugbear, except to 
canvass the challenge as it relates to current trajectories in the climate 
justice movement. Nonetheless a movement for climate justice (or some 
iteration of this) seems the most fruitful site of agency in the contest over 
our climate.  
Conclusion 
To recap, this paper has delivered the following propositions. Those 
pursuing the climate market agenda are winning the long ‘war of 
position’, most notably through the agency of financial sector, state and 
international institutional actors, but also through the active support from 
ENGOs. However, the incomplete nature of the neoliberal climate 
project highlights distinct possibilities for social and political change. 
The resulting challenge lies in forging a philosophy of praxis and 
collective agency capable of inciting a paradigm shift beyond the market, 
and beyond the dilemmas of liberal compromise. I have proposed that the 
ENGOs and community groups organising for climate action are limited 
in their capacity to undo the hegemony of the market agenda. 
Ambivalence toward the market agenda and a distinct silence in regards 
to any form of political vision beyond calling for state-led regulation is 
ultimately serving as implicit support for the carbon market. By way of 
an alternative, I suggest that generating a popular movement for climate 
justice is paramount to the struggle against carbon markets, both in its 
reactive and proactive forms. In light of the strategic questions raised in 
Cochabamba, a most vital site for movement development will be 
realising post-capitalist institutional reforms, whilst remaining in 
sustained struggle for climate justice from below.  
This work is a beginning only for political scientists and movement 
actors seeking the spaces through which a new, more fruitful, agenda for 
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climate politics might be conceived. I have contended that a neo-
Gramscian philosophy of praxis and notions of hegemony and counter-
hegemony offer a valuable means through which contestation over 
climate change can be understood, critiqued and thereby invigorated. 
Gramscian insights assist a view of the full configuration of collectivities 
weighing in to the struggle over climate governance. Moreover, 
explicating the specific philosophies of praxis that figure as sites of 
consensual legitimation, as well as potential counter hegemony, serve as 
a means to re-link theory and practice. However, there is much more 
analytic work to be done in operationalising these ideas and pinning 
down the basis for a hegemonic trajectory toward climate justice. Further 
empirical research, prioritising the process of contestation in carbon 
market formation, will help steer critical analysis (inside and outside 
academia) forward. Movements for climate justice will lead the way. 
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